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Abstract
Imitation learning can reproduce policies by observing experts, which poses a
problem regarding policy privacy. Policies, such as human, or policies on deployed
robots, can all be cloned without consent from the owners. How can we protect
against external observers cloning our proprietary policies? To answer this question
we introduce a new reinforcement learning framework, where we train an ensemble
of near-optimal policies, whose demonstrations are guaranteed to be useless for an
external observer. We formulate this idea by a constrained optimization problem,
where the objective is to improve proprietary policies, and at the same time dete-
riorate the virtual policy of an eventual external observer. We design a tractable
algorithm to solve this new optimization problem by modifying the standard policy
gradient algorithm. Our formulation can be interpreted in lenses of confidentiality
and adversarial behaviour, which enables a broader perspective of this work. We
demonstrate the existence of “non-clonable” ensembles, providing a solution to the
above optimization problem, which is calculated by our modified policy gradient
algorithm. To our knowledge, this is the first work regarding the protection of
policies in Reinforcement Learning.
1 Introduction
Imitation learning and behavioral cloning provide really strong ability to create powerful policies,
as seen in robotic tasks (Laskey et al. (2017); Finn et al. (2017); Codevilla et al. (2019, 2017);
Pomerleau (1988); Bojarski et al. (2016)). Other fields in machine learning have developed methods
to ensure privacy (Al-Rubaie and Chang (2019); Papernot et al. (2016)), however, none have examined
protection against policy cloning. In this work, we tackle the issue of protecting policies by training
policies that aim to prevent an external observer from using behaviour cloning. Our approach draws
inspiration from imitating human experts, who can near-optimally accomplish given tasks. The
setting which we analyze is presented in Figure 1. We wish to find a collection of experts, which as an
ensemble can perform a given task well, however, also targets behaviour cloning through adversarial
behaviour. Another interpretation is that this collection of experts represents the worst case scenario
for behaviour cloning on how to perform a task "good enough".
Imitation learning frameworks generally make certain assumptions of the optimality of the demon-
strations (Ziebart et al. (2008); Levine (2018)), yet never considered the scenario when the experts
specifically attempt to be adversarial to the imitator. We pose the novel question regarding this
assumption: does there exist a set of experts that are adversarial to an external observer trying to
behaviour clone?
We propose Adversarial Policy Ensembles (APE), a method that simultaneously optimizes the
performance of the ensemble and minimizes the performance of policies eventually obtained from
cloning it. Our experiments show that APE do not suffer much performance loss from an optimal
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Figure 1: Confidentiality scheme: Left During training, optimize a Policy Ensemble by estimating
gradients using both the policies in the ensemble and the fictitious observer policy. Right When
collecting a dataset for cloning, the context variable is marginalized out. Thus cloning the Policy
Ensemble can result in a useless policy
policy, while causing, on average, the cloned policy to experience over 5 times degradation compared
to the optimal policy.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We introduce a novel method APE, as well as the mathematical justification of the notion of
adversarial experts.
• By modifying Policy Gradient (Sutton et al. (2000)), a common reinforcement learning
algorithm, we suggest a tractable scheme for finding an optimal solution for this objective.
• We demonstrate the solution by numerical simulations, where we show that a cloned policy
is crippled even after collecting a significantly large number of samples from a policy
ensemble.
To our knowledge, not only is this the first work regarding the protection of policies in reinforcement
learning, but it is also the first to represent adversarial experts.
2 Preliminaries
We develop APE in the standard framework of Reinforcement Learning (RL). The main components
we use are Markov Decision Processes, Policy Gradient (Sutton et al. (2000)), policy ensembles, and
behaviour cloning, which we review below.
2.1 Markov Decision Process
A discrete-time finite-horizon discounted Markov decision process (MDP) M is defined by
(S,A, r, p, p0, γ, T ) where S is the state space, A is the action space, r : S × A → R is the
reward function, p(st+1|st, at) is the transition probability distribution, p0 : S → R+ is the ini-
tial state distribution, γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and T is the time horizon. A trajectory
τ ∼ ρpi, sampled from p and a policy pi : S × A → R+, is defined to be the states and actions
tuple (s0, a0, ...sT−1, aT−1, sT ), whose distribution is characterized by ρpi. Define the return of
a trajectory to be r(τ) =
∑T−1
t=0 γ
tr(st, at) to be the sum of discounted rewards seen along the
trajectory, and define a value function V pi : S → R to be expected return of a trajectory starting from
state s, under the policy pi. The goal of reinforcement learning is to find a policy that maximizes the
expected return Eτ∼ρpi [r(τ)].
2.2 Policy Gradient
Policy Gradient (PG) Sutton et al. (2000) aim to directly learn the optimal policy pi, parameterized
by θ, by repeatedly estimating the gradient of the expected return, in one of many forms, shown in
Schulman et al. (2015). In our work, we follow notation similar to that of Schulman et al. (2015,
2017) and estimate ∇θ Eτ∼ρpi [r(τ)] using the advantage, which is estimated from a trajectory τ ,
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Apiτ (t) = Rτ (t)− V pi(st), where Rτ (t) =
∑T−1
t′=t γ
t′r(st′ , at′) is the sum of the reward following
action at.
Here, the value function is learned simultaneously with the the policy, and so the advantage will use
Vˆ pi as an estimate for V pi .
2.3 Policy Ensemble (PE)
We denote a PE by pic, where each pic(i) , i ∈ {1, 2, ...n} represents an expert. To rollout the PE, an
expert is chosen at random (in our case uniform), and the expert completes a trajectory. Each expert
policy pic(i)(a|s) can be viewed as a policy conditioned on a latent variable c, pi(a|s, c).
Although pic consists of multiple policies, it is important to note that it itself is still a policy.
2.4 Behaviour Cloning
To behaviour clone an expert policy (Widrow and W. Smith (1964)), a dataset of trajectoriesD consist-
ing of state action pairs (s, a) are collected from the the expert rollouts. Then, a policy parametized
by φ is trained by maximizing the likelihood of an action given a state,
∑
(s,a)∈D log piφ(a | s).
When cloning pic, D will not contain information of the latent variable c, and so the cloned policy
will marginalize it out. Thus, the observer will clone:
pio(a | s) :=
∑
i
p(c(i) | s)pic(i)(a | s) (1)
We stress that this policy does not exist until pic is behaviour cloned. pio is a fictitious policy to
represent what would happen in the best case scenario of the observer having access to infinite data
from pic to clone into pio.
The scope of this paper is to specifically prevent behavioral cloning from succeeding. Other imitation
learning approaches such as inverse reinforcement learning (Abbeel and Ng (2004); Ng and Russell
(2000); Levine et al. (2011)) and adversarial imitation learning (Ho and Ermon (2016); Peng et al.
(2018)) require rollouts of non-expert policies in the environment, which may be costly, and thus are
not considered.
3 Related Work
Adversarial Attacks in RL: Our notion of adversarial policies is inextricably related to other
adversarial methods that target RL such as Lin et al. (2017), and Behzadan and Munir (2017), that add
adversarial perturbations to policy input during training. Other adversarial attacks include poisoning
the batch of data used when training RL (Ma et al. (2019)), and exploitation in the multi-agent setting
(Gleave et al. (2019)). However, these methods all present as active attacks for various learning
techniques. Our method, instead, passively protects against cloning.
Privacy in RL: With regards to protection, our work is related to differential privacy (Al-Rubaie and
Chang (2019)). Differential privacy in RL can be used to create private Q-functions (Wang and Hegde
(2019)) or private policies (Balle et al. (2016)), which have private reward functions or private policy
evaluation. However, we would like to emphasize that our motivation is to prevent cloning, and thus
protecting the policies, rather than protecting against differentiating between reward functions and
policies.
Imitation Learning: Since we comply to the standard imitation learning setting of cloning from a
dataset with many experts providing the demonstrations, latent variables w.r.t. imitation learning is
well-studied. For example, Codevilla et al. (2017) show that conditioning on context representation
can make imitation learning a viable option for autonomous driving. Li et al. (2017) demonstrate
that the latent contextual information in expert trajectories is often semantically meaningful. As well,
providing extra context variables to condition on also appears in forms of extra queries or providing
labels (Brown et al. (2019); de Haan et al. (2019); Hristov et al. (2018)). Our method is different, as
we use context variables to prevent imitation learning while learning the policies from scratch, rather
than assuming using context variables to increase performance of imitation learning.
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Multiple Policies: VALOR, DIAYN, and DADS (Achiam et al. (2018); Eysenbach et al. (2018);
Sharma et al. (2019)) have similar schemes of sampling a latent variable and fixing it throughout a
trajectory, although their latent variables (contexts or skills) are used to solve semantically different
tasks. The reason to solve different tasks is due to the objective of using the context variable/skills for
learning in an unsupervised setting. Our approach differs in both motivation and implementation, as
we learn experts that all solve the same task, and constrain so that observers can not clone the policy.
A PE pic can also be viewed as a Mixture of Experts (Jacobs et al. (1991)), except the gating network
assigns probability 1 to the same expert for an entire trajectory. As such, we do not learn the gating
network, although it may still be useful to see pic as a special case of a mixture of experts where the
gating network learns immediately to fix the expert for each trajectory. There are also methods such
as OptionGAN (Henderson et al. (2018)), which uses a mixture of experts model to learn multiple
policies as options with access to only expert states.
Zhang et al. (2019) also proposes a method to train multiple policies that complete the same task but
uses the uncertainty of an autoencoder as a reward augment. Their motivation is to find multiple novel
policies, while our motivation has no connection to novelty. Due to these differences in motivation,
they train each policy one after the other, while our policies are trained simultaneously.
Policy ensembles are also used in the multi-task and goal conditioned settings in which case the
task that is meant to be solved can be viewed as the context. Marginalizing out the context variable
(Equation 1) of these context-conditioned policies is studied in the case of introducing a KL divergence
regularizing term for learning new tasks (Goyal et al. (2019)) and for sharing/hiding goals (Strouse
et al. (2018)). However, the main motivation is different in that both Goyal et al. (2019) and Strouse
et al. (2018) use pio to optimize mutual information, while we directly optimize its performance.
4 Method
4.1 Objective
We wish to have experts that can perform the task, while minimizing the possible returns of the cloned
policy, denoted in Equation 1. We modify the standard RL objective to be:
argmin
θ
Eτ∼ρpio [r(τ)] s.t. Eτ∼ρpic [r(τ)] ≥ α (2)
where α is a parameter that lower bounds the reward of the policy ensemble. This translates to
maximizing the unconstrained Lagrangian:
J(θ) = Eτ∼ρpic [r(τ)]− β Eτ∼ρpio [r(τ)] (3)
where 1/β is the corresponding Lagrangian multiplier, and is subsumed into the returns collected by
the policy ensemble. We refer to PE that optimizes this objective as Adversarial Policy Ensembles
(APE). There is a natural interpretation of the objective in Equation 2. Human experts tend to be
"good enough", which is reflected in the constraint. The minimization is simply finding the most
adversarial experts.
Although we assume that the observer can only map states to actions, it may be the case that they
can train a sequential policy, which is dependent on its previous states and actions. Our method can
be generalized to sequential policies as well, and the impact of such observers is discussed in the
Section 6.
4.2 Modified Policy Gradient Algorithm
Intuitively, since there are the returns of two policies that are being optimized, both should be sampled
from to estimate the returns.
We show how we can modify PG to train APE, by maximizing Equation 3. The two terms suggest
a simple scheme to estimate the returns of the policy ensemble twice: once using pic that we wish
to maximize, and a second time using pio, which approximates the returns of an eventual observer
who tries to clone the policy ensemble. Along with our PE, we train value functions V˜ pic(i) for each
expert, jointly parameterized by φ which estimates V pic(i) − βV pio . The loss function for the value
functions of two sampled trajectories τ1, τ2 is
4
Jτ1,τ2(φ) =
T1−1∑
t=0
1
2
(
V˜
pi
c(i)
φ (st1)−Rτ1(t)
)2
+
T2−1∑
t=0
1
2
(
V˜
pi
c(i)
φ (st2) + βRτ2(t)
)2
(4)
The policy gradient update from N1 and N2 trajectories is then
∇θJτ1,τ2(θ) ≈ G1 +G2 (5)
where
G1 =
1
N1
N1∑
j=1
T1∑
t=0
∇θ log pic(i)(a(j)t1 | s(j)t1 )A˜
pi
c(i)
τ1 (t) (6)
G2 =
1
N2
N2∑
j=1
T2∑
t=0
∇θ log pio(a(j)t2 | s(j)t2 )A˜pioτ2 (t) (7)
where c(i) identifies the chosen expert of the trajectory., and A˜
pi
c(i)
τ1 (t) = Rτ1(t) − V˜ pic(i) (st) and
A˜pioτ2 (t) = −βRτ2(t)−V˜ pio(st) are the modified advantage functions. The−β that is in the advantage
in G2 optimizes against the performance of the observed policy pio.
The gradient G1 for pic is straightforward. However, to estimate the gradient G2 for pio which is an
fictitious policy, we sample from it by first re-sampling the context of the expert at each state, and
then sampling an action from the context. The back-propagation occurs to pic(i)(a | s) for the context
sampled at each state. Practical implementation details can be found in A.2. The intuition is as follow.
While sampling pio, if a selected action causes high return, we should decrease the probability, which
lowers the expected reward of pio. Combined, the two gradients will cause the PE to select actions
that both achieves high reward, and are detrimental to the observer.
Equations 4 and 5 formulate our PG approach of APE, which is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: PG-APE
Require: θ, φ,M, β
1: for each iteration do:
2: Generate trajectories τ1 with pic fromM for Equation 6
3: Generate trajectories τ2 with pio fromM for Equation 7
4: Calculate Equation 5 to perform a gradient update on the PE θ ← θ + αθ∇ˆθJτ1,τ2(θ)
5: Update the value function φ← φ− αφ∇ˆφJτ1,τ2(φ) as determined by Equation 4.
6: end for
5 Experiments
We perform experiments on a navigation task, where the objective is to reach a goal state as fast as
possible. The purpose is to illustrate that an APE can cause the cloned policy to take significantly
longer to reach the goal state. We do so by first training a PE and behaviour cloning it. We then
compare the performance of the PE to that of the clone. We use a discrete environment to best
demonstrate the validity of the equation. This is because all discrete policies can be parameterized,
which is not true in continuous, where typically Gaussian parameterization is used. As such,
continuous environments would have to make assumptions about how both the PE and the cloner
parameterizes policies, as well as tackle problems of distributional drift, which we would like to
avoid. However, with these assumptions, our setting can extend to the continuous domain. In our
experiments, we use a 10 × 10 grid-world environment as our main testbed. This is to have large
enough expression that would not be found in smaller grids, while still small enough to visualize
the behaviour of the APE. The discrete actions will show precisely how the experts can be jointly
adversarial.
Using gridworld allows for precise expected return estimates. In an environment where there is no
computable analytical solution for the returns, approximation error can accumulate through estimating
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Figure 2: Visualization of APE for 2 experts. We set β = 0.6. Arrows indicate action probabilities,
and the colour scale represents the hitting time. Yellow indicates expected reward of 0, while purple
indicates expected reward of −100, which is the maximum episode length. The top left corner is the
goal state, and the adjacent states that are purple are an example of how APE is adversarial to
cloning, as those states will cause the cloned policy to suffer larger losses.
the returns of both the trained PE and the clone. This noise would only increase in continuous state
space, where the returns of pio may not be tractable to estimate due to issues such as distributional
drift (Ross et al. (2010); Codevilla et al. (2019); de Haan et al. (2019)).
Our results answer the following questions. How much optimality is compromised? How useless can
we make the cloned policy? Is it possible to use non APE to prevent behaviour cloning?
5.1 Training
Even though our method can compute a policy ensemble with any finite number of experts, we chose
to visualize a solution with 2 experts, which is sufficient to reveal the essential properties of the
method. Specifically, we train n = 2 tabular experts with PG-APE. Our code is written in Tensorflow
(Abadi et al. (2016)). Training details and hyper-parameters are in Section A.1 of the Appendix.
5.2 Environment
The basic environment is a 10× 10 grid, with the goal state at the top left corner. The agent spawns
in a random non-goal state, and incurs a reward of −1 for each time-step until it reaches the goal. At
the goal state, the agent no longer receives a loss and terminates the episode. The agent is allowed
five actions, A = { Up, Down, Left, Right, Stay }. Moving into the wall is equivalent to executing a
Stay action. We choose this reward function for the benefit of having a clear representation of the
notion of "good enough", which is reflected in how long it takes to reach the goal state. Having such
representation exemplifies how the APE can prevent an observer from cloning a good policy.
5.3 Visualization
Figure 2 shows an example of a PE that is trained for the basic gridworld environment. Figure 3
shows the corresponding cloned policy, as well as a comparison to an optimal policy. The colour
scale represents the expected return of starting at a given state.
In the case of an optimal policy (β = 0), actions are taken to take the agent to the goal state as fast as
possible. However, when β > 0, such a solution is no longer the optimum. Similar to β = 0, the
experts would like to maximize the expected reward, and reach the goal state. However, to minimize
the reward of the observed policy, the two expert policies must jointly learn to increase the number
of steps needed for pio to reach the goal state. The expert policies must use adversarial behaviour
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while reaching the goal state, such as taking intelligent detours or Stay in the same state, which are
learned to hinder pio as much as possible. These learnt behaviours cause the cloned policy to take
a drastically longer time to reach the goal. For example, note the two purple squares at the top-left
near the goal, which indicates that the experts understand that they should not move to prevent the
observer from attaining reward. Even though these sub-optimal decisions are made, on expectation,
the experts are "not bad" and achieve an average of −15.27 reward.
5.4 Baselines
Figure 3: Visualization of the cloned APE. The
policy obtained from cloning the APE trained has av-
erage expected reward of −45.18, while the optimal
policy has an average expected reward of −9, which
is over a 5× increase.
We use behaviour cloning to clone our PG-
APE trained policies. To support our claims
of preventing IL even in the horizon of infi-
nite data, we collect a million timesteps of
the trained PE in the environment. Further de-
tails of behaviour cloning are in the appendix.
Shown in Figure 3 is an optimal policy, and
the resulting cloned policy from Section 5.1.
We evaluate against other PE, to show that
preventing against behaviour cloning is non-
trivial. We use several baselines. We first
test policies that have approximately the same
return as our ensemble by training PE with
vanilla PG, and halting early rather than run-
ning until convergence. In the Near-Optimal
case, we ran until the PE had expected re-
turns that matched the average achieved by
our method. Conversely, "Random" policies
are used as a comparison to show that it is pos-
sible to cause the cloned policy to do poorly,
but the tradeoff is that the PE itself cannot
perform well, which is undesirable. These
policies are also policies trained with PG, ex-
cept they are stopped much earlier, when their
clones matches the expected returns of our
PG-APE. For each PG-APE, we use n = 2
different tabular policies treated as an ensemble, which we then clone, and average across 5 seeds.
For the baselines, we hand-pick the policies, and thus only use 3 different policies.
PE Returns Clone Returns Returns Difference
PG-APE -16.24 ± 1.20 -44.27 ± 1.07 -28.03
Near-Optimal PE -16.74 ± 1.32 -16.67 ± 1.31 +0.07
Random Policy -44.59 ± 0.52 -44.52 ± 0.77 +0.07
Table 1: Comparison of cloned PE. Each policy has their Returns precisely calculated through their
analytical solutions. The final column reports the difference between the PE and the Clone, which is
only significant for our method.
As presented in Table 1, all other PE have an insignificant difference (returns of the PE subtracted
from returns of the cloned policy) between the performance of the PE and the cloned policy, except for
our method. These empirical findings show that preventing behaviour cloning difficult, but possible
using APE.
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6 Discussion & Future Work
Confidential Policies: There are promising research directions regarding the protection of policies,
due to the many applications where confidentiality is crucial. As long as there is a model of the
observer, our presented method provides a worst-case scenario of experts.
In our work, we focused on the case where the observer does not use the current trajectory to
determine their policy. Instead, it may be the case that the observer uses a sequential policy (one that
depends on its previous states and/or actions), such as an RNN to determine the context of the current
expert.
Formally, the observer will no longer learn the policy formulated in Equation 1 that is solely dependent
on the current state, but rather a policy that is dependent on the current trajectory:
pio(a | τ1:t) :=
∑
i
p(c(i) | τ1:t)pic(i)(a | s) (8)
We found in our preliminary results that using an RNN classifier which outputs p(c|τ1:t) simply
ended up in with either optimal policies or crippled policies. In both cases, there was a relatively
minor difference in performance between the policy ensemble and the cloned policy.
Unsurprisingly, when the observer has access to a strong enough representation for their policy, then
they should be able to imitate any policy. In this case, the worst-case set of experts cannot do much
to prevent the cloning. We believe that this is an exciting conclusion, and is grounds for future work.
Continuous: Although our methods are evaluated in discrete state spaces, our approach can be
generalized to continuous domains.
The Monte Carlo sampling in Equation 9 suggests that the use of continuous context may also be
possible, given there is a strong enough function approximator to estimate the distribution of c|s. We
see this as an exciting direction for future work, to recover the full spectrum of possible adversarial
policies under the constraint of Equation 2.
The Semantics of Reward: Although the minimization in Equation 2 implies a logical equivalence
between the success of behaviour cloning to the reward the cloned policy can achieve, it may follow
that this is not the case. It may be the case that useless is defined differently by the expected reward
the cloned policy achieves on a different reward function r˜. For example, a robot that is unpredictable
should not be deployed with humans. Since the r functions in Equation 2 are disentangled, the reward
function r that is minimized in Equation 2 can be engineered to fit any definition of uselessness.
We can modify the objective of APE by modifying Equations 4 and 5 to use a different reward
function r˜ in the minimization, substituting R(t) for R˜(t) =
∑T−1
t′=t γ
t′−tr˜(st′ , at′). The rest of the
derivation and algorithm remain the same.
We think this is an exciting direction, especially for learning all different possible representations of
the worst-case experts.
7 Conclusion
We present APE as well as its mathematical formulation, and show that policy gradient, a basic
RL algorithm can be used to optimize a policy ensemble that cannot be cloned. We evaluated APE
against baselines to show that adversarial behaviour is not feasible without our method.
This work identifies a novel yet crucial area in Reinforcement Learning, regarding the confidentiality
of proprietary policies. The essence of our approach is that a policy ensemble can achieve high return
for the policy owner, while providing an external observer with a guaranteed low reward, making
proprietary ensemble useless to the observer.
The formulation of our problem setup and the algorithm are very general. In this first work we
demonstrate the solution in the deliberately chosen simple environments in order to better visualize
the essence of our method. In our concurrent work we study thoroughly the application of our method
in various domains, which is out of the scope of this introductory paper.
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A Appendix
A.1 Training Details & Hyperparameters
For our training, we set αθ = 0.05, and the value weight to be 0.5, use annealed entropy regularization
(Mnih et al. (2016)) from 5e−1 to 5e−3 and set the discount factor γ = 0.99. Due to the contrasting
gradients experienced, large batch sizes are used. In our experiments, we take 1 gradient update of
AdaM (Kingma and Ba (2015)) per batch of 4096 (containing multiple trajectories), and trained for
3e6 timesteps.
To estimate p(c|s) in Equation 1, we use a replay buffer that keeps track of the previous 60 contexts
seen at each state.
Estimating the quantity in Equation 8 requires memory, which we use a single GRU (Cho et al.
(2014)) as done in Strouse et al. (2018), with the exception that only states are fed in as a one-hot.
Due to our environment is deterministic, state sequences captures the action sequence information.
The single unit is then concatenated with the state, which feeds into a fully connected layer of 128,
and then a soft-max, to produce the distribution c|s over contexts.
For our behaviour cloning, we collect 1e6 state action pairs, and train a tabular policy with 0.01
learning rate on cross entropy softmax loss for 100 epochs. The large amount of data and epochs is to
ensure that we can recover pio with little to no variance.
To solve the precise returns of the policies, we inject noise of 1e− 9, to ensure a hitting time always
exists from each state. As well, we clip all the hitting times to T = 100.
A.2 Estimating∇θ log pio
It is not obvious how ∇θ log pio should be estimated, since pio is never realized until the policy is
cloned. Literally, it is a virtual policy.
Equation 1 offers a straightforward method to back-propagate, similar to that of the Mixture of
Experts model (Jacobs et al. (1991)), except using an estimate of c|s instead of a gating network.
However, we can also rewrite Equation 1 as
∑
i p(c
(i)|s)pic(i)(a | s) = Ec∼p(c|s)[pic(i)(a | s)], which
results in the gradient update being:
∇θ log pio(a|s) = ∇θ logEc∼p(c|s)[pic(i)(a | s)] (9)
which suggests a method of Monte Carlo sampling the inner expectation with 1 sampled context.
Empirically, we use the Monte Carlo sampling method.
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